Project Shield America

Office of Investigations: National Security

Mission and Necessity of Shield America Amount of Illegal Exports Implementation Results How American Business Can Help Related Agencies Red Flags Shield America Pamphlet (PDF)

Mission and Necessity of Shield America

Mission

Project Shield America is an integral part of the U.S. ICE strategy of preventing illegal exporters, targeted foreign countries, terrorist groups, and international criminal organizations from trafficking in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their components; obtaining and illegally exporting licensable commodities, technologies, conventional munitions, and firearms; exporting stolen property; and engaging in financial and other transactions which support these activities or which violate U.S. sanctions and embargoes.

U.S. ICE is the first line of defense at our Nation's borders to protect the American public from international terrorism. Our mission in combating international terrorism is two-fold:

Protect the American public from the introduction of WMD and other instruments of terror into the U.S. Prevent international terrorists and criminal organizations from obtaining WMD materials and technologies, arms, funds, and other support from U.S. and foreign sources.

Necessity of Shield America

Adversaries of the U.S. have acquired U.S. and Western technology since the Second World War by various means, both legal and illegal. Such acquisitions have provided these countries with the fruits of Western research and strategic technology largely without cost, and have permitted these countries to channel their resources to other areas. U.S. munitions and technology have assisted our adversaries in jeopardizing our soldiers, citizens, and interests. The fact that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their components are more widely available to terrorists and rogue Nations now than at any other time in our history, has necessitated the development, implementation, and success of Project Shield America.

Amount of Illegal Exports

As with any illegal trade, the exact volume is difficult to measure or even to estimate. U.S. ICE criminal investigations and seizures indicate, however, that such trade can be valued in the tens of millions of dollars annually. The monetary value of the illegal exports discovered by U.S. ICE is often secondary to the strategic and potential military value of these products. For example, in one investigation a sophisticated military aviation guidance system was seized by Customs prior to its exportation from the U.S. While the value of this system was only a few thousand dollars, its acquisition by our adversaries could have jeopardized the security of the U.S. and its allies.

Implementation

U.S. ICE has designed and implemented Project Shield America to work in concert with the three-pronged effort of its Export Enforcement Program:

• Inspection/Interdiction
  The inspection and interdiction effort utilizes specially trained U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Inspectors stationed at high threat ports to selectively inspect suspect export shipments.
  
  
• Investigations
  The investigations effort involves U.S. ICE Special Agents deployed throughout the country, who initiate and pursue high quality cases which result in the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of offenders of the Export Administration Act, Arms Export Control Act, Trading with the Enemy Act, International Emergency Economics Powers Act, and other related statutes. U.S. ICE efforts are concentrated in the proactive mode utilizing various techniques to detect and disrupt illegal exports before they can cause damage to the national security interests of the United States.
  
  
• International Cooperation
  The international cooperation effort focuses on the use of ICE Attaché offices enlisting the support of their host governments. This is done in an effort to initiate new investigative leads, which are based on information provided by their foreign contacts, and to develop information in support of on-going domestic investigations.
  
  Information developed by U.S. ICE as the result of Project Shield America industry contacts, is used to support and enhance these three interdependent efforts.
  
  These efforts are all supported by the Exodus Command Center located in Washington, D.C. This Center maintains contacts with the U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and other agencies concerned with the export of critical U.S. technologies, munitions, and services.

Some of the strategic technology most urgently needed by certain proscribed countries includes:

• Modern manufacturing technology for the production of microelectronics, computers, digital electronic components, and signal processing systems.
  
  
• Technology necessary for the development of aircraft, missile, and other tactical weapon delivery systems.
  
  
• All types of advanced signal and weapons detection, tracking and monitoring systems.
  
  
• Technology and equipment used in the construction of nuclear weapons and materials.
  
  
• Biological, chemical warfare agents and precursors, and associated manufacturing equipment.

Results

Since its inception in 1981, the U.S. ICE (formerly U.S. Customs) Export Enforcement Program has been responsible for seizures of controlled technology including laser guidance devices, military equipment, sophisticated computer systems, and numerous other items critical to allied defense and U.S. industry. These seizures have also included high-technology items designed primarily for civilian use, but the export of which is controlled to certain destinations because of potential military use.

Recognizing the success of this Program, other countries have initiated their own export control programs, often through training provided by U.S. ICE personnel.

Significant Investigations

U.S. Fighter Jet Components to Iran - On July 6, 2005, an Iranian businessman was sentenced to 57 months incarceration pursuant to pleading guilty for his role in a scheme to illegally export F-4 and F-14 fighter jet components to Iran. The subject sought to obtain 100 gunnery systems from suppliers in Maryland for export to Iran. The subject was arrested after additional undercover meetings in which he sought to acquire fully assembled F-14 fighter jet aircraft for future shipment to Iran.

Weapons to Colombian Terrorist Group - On February 11, 2005, a Colombian national pleaded guilty to charges of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and violating the Arms Export Control Act. The subject plotted to provide $4 million worth of arms to a Colombian terrorist organization. The subject sought to illegally export 4,000 grenades, 1,800 assault rifles, 60 grenade launchers and 60 machine guns. The subject was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.

Missile Components to China - On July 16, 2004, a naturalized U.S. citizen, who was president of a Florida, based company, and a second Chinese subject pleaded guilty to making false statements in connection with illegally exporting to China 25 low-noise amplifier chips that have applications in the U.S. Hellfire missile. ICE agents arrested the pair in Orlando, Florida, on March 12, 2004, on charges of violating the Export Administration Act, conspiracy, and false statements.

Satellite Technology to China - On March 4, 2003, two major defense industry corporations entered into a civil settlement with the State Department in which the companies agreed to pay a $32 million fine, $8 million of which would go to ICE. The agreement settled charges that the firms had illegally shared sensitive satellite technology/technical data with China.

How American Business Can Help

Project Shield America is not intended to restrict or discourage legitimate U.S. exports. It is designed to protect the technical accomplishments resulting from American ingenuity and labor, and to prevent our adversaries from achieving technological parity or gaining a military advantage through illegal acquisition of U.S. technology. To achieve success in this endeavor, the cooperation of the exporting community with U.S. ICE is essential. It should be strongly emphasized that all individuals, private sector and military, who are involved in any aspect of high technology research, development, production, or sales are potential acquisition targets. A company may consider a product that is being developed to be insignificant when compared to more publicized, sought after technologies, but it must be remembered that a small technological project could easily be the necessary component to a major technological development. U.S. ICE solicits your assistance in providing information relating to suspicious acquisition attempts or exports of critical technology, munitions items, or services.

U.S. ICE recommends that our Industry Partners implement an Export Management System (EMS). An effective EMS consists of the following elements:

• A policy statement demonstrating senior management's commitment to export control.
  
  
• Identification of positions within the company responsible for export control.
  
  
• An up-to-date training program for employees with exports responsibilities.
  
  
• A program for maintaining records in compliance with export regulations.
  
  
• Periodic internal review of the EMS.
  
  
• A procedure for dealing with violations or non-compliance of exports regulations.
  
  
• A strict policy of reporting suspicious orders or inquiries to U.S. Customs.

Our critical technology is an important asset to our National security and could be an instrument of intimidation or destruction in the hands of our adversaries. Only through the combined effort of U.S. ICE and the private sector can we preempt the flow of our technology to hostile countries and groups.

If you have information regarding international terrorism, violations of U.S. export laws, or economic sanctions and embargoes, and wish to speak to a U.S. ICE Special Agent, please call: 1-866-DHS-2-ICE. You will remain anonymous and could receive a cash award for your information.

Related Agencies

U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control

U.S. Department of State
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

U.S. Department of Commerce
Bureau of Industry and Security

Red Flags

Indications of Potential Illegal Exports

U.S. ICE solicits the assistance of private industry to provide information relating to suspicious acquisitions of high technology and munitions items, or services relating to these items. The following are possible indicators of illegal exports or diversions:

• The customer is willing to pay cash for a high value order rather than use a standard method of payment, which usually involves a letter of credit.
  
  
• The customer is willing to pay well in excess of market value for the commodities.
  
  
• The purchaser is reluctant to provide information on the end-use or end-user, of the product.
  
  
• The end-use information provided is incompatible with the customary purpose for which the product is designed.
  
  
• The final consignee is a trading company, freight forwarder, export company, or other entity with no apparent connection to the purchaser.
  
  
• The customer appears unfamiliar with the product, its application, support equipment, or performance.
  
  
• The packaging requirements are inconsistent with the shipping mode or destination.
  
  
• The customer orders products or options that do not correspond with their line of business.
  
  
• The customer has little or no business background.
  
  
• Firms or individuals from foreign countries other than the country of the stated end-user place the order.
  
  
• The order is being shipped via circuitous or economically illogical routing.
  
  
• The customer declines the normal service, training, or installation contracts.
  
  
• The product is inappropriately or unprofessionally packaged (e.g. odd sized/re-taped boxes, hand lettering in lieu of printing, altered labels, or labels that cover old ones).vThe size or weight of the package does not fit the product described.
  
  
• "Fragile" or other special markings on the package are inconsistent with the commodity described.

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